Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This activity l e v el can be endogenized in any of several ways as whether to incur a xed cost of activity, a s output choice, or as quality c hoice. Our model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the same features which m a k e the Cournot model attractive. Unlike in a Cournot model with similar incomplete information, Bertrand pro ts always increase in the probability other rms are inactive. Pro ts decline more sharply than in the Cournot model, and the pattern is similar to that found empirically b y Bresnahan & Reiss 1991.
Introduction
Consider a carpenter who is asked by a house owner to submit a tender for renovating part of the house. He considers it very likely that if the homeowner has asked for tenders from other carpenters, he gives the job to the carpenter with the lowest tender. However, he also knows there is a chance that the homeowner has not found any other carpenter free to do the work that month and will give the job to him even if his tender is rather high. What price will the carpenter charge?
The price will certainly be above marginal cost. With some probability the carpenter is a monopolist who can charge the monopoly price but with some probability he faces competition. We will model the situation and show that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies and that expected industry pro ts are positive for any number of rms. Moreover, not only do expected pro ts rise with seller concentration, but the model does reasonably well in explaining the empirical results of Bresnahan and Reiss 1991 on how industry pro ts increase.
The model allows for many i n terpretations, in two categories. First, uncertainty about the existence of competitors may arise from uncertainty about consumer search behavior, as in the carpenter example. It may be unclear whether consumers regard rival commodities as perfect substitutes, consumer search costs may be uncertain from the rm's perspective, or consumers may v ary in their sophistication. Examples of this range from grocery shopping to buying clothing from mail order companies depending on what catalogs have been received to buying beers that to some consumers all taste alike but to other consumers do not.
Second, uncertainty about the existence of competitors may arise from uncertainty about other sellers' behavior. It may be unclear whether rivals have hit their capacity constraints in which case they cannot compete for additional consumers, whether rivals have e n tered yet, whether rivals have grossly overpriced by mistake o r ignorance, or whether rivals have temporarily high costs. It may be unclear whether other competitors have also discovered a new market, or in black marke t s i t m a y b e di cult to know the number of rms operating in that market cf., Janssen and Van Reeven, 1998 . Examples of these range from wholesale distribution of candy bars where in periods of peak demand rst one and then another manufacturer may h i t capacity to airline ticket pricing to sales of unusual but not rare antiques or used books. Any of these situations can be modelled as uncertainty o ver the number of active r i v als.
In the two-stage models considered in Section 3, we endogenize the entry decision of rms and show that in three di erent settings, entry will be a random decision in the equilibrium of the game: i auctions, as in the carpenter example, ii choosing output or capacity, a n d i i i c hoosing whether to produce high or low quality. An important feature of all three settings will be that the entry decision itself is not observed before rms decide on their pricing behavior.
The paper is related to several di erent literatures. A variety of models, of which Salop & Stiglitz 1977 and Varian 1980 are early examples, have shown that competitive markets can have price dispersion even in equilibrium, with di erent rms charging di erent prices for an identical good because of heterogeneous consumer search, some consumers observing more prices than others. The closest of these to the present model is Burdett &Judd 1983 , in which some consumers observe o n e price, some two prices, some three, and so forth. Our model di ers in a number of respects. First, while one possible interpretation is that consumers di er with respect to the number of prices they observe, our model allows for the other interpretations mentioned earlier, interpretations inappropriate for search models. Second, we analyze a strategic model instead of a competitive one, which a l l o ws us to study the impact on pricing behavior of the number of rms, a variable not relevant i n B u rdett &Judd 1983. Finally and most important, we treat uncertainty di erently. I n our model, a rm believes there is a xed probability t h a t a n y of its competitors is active, whereas in Burdett and Judd it is the probability that a consumer observes a certain number of prices that is exogenous. The di erence lies in what happens as the number of sellers increases. In our model, a seller knows that the probability that at least one other rm is actively competing with it has become closer to one. This drives prices closer to marginal cost, and in the limit we obtain the standard Bertrand outcome. Burdett and Judd still have price dispersion and positive industry pro ts as the number of rms becomes in nite, because each r m m a y still be visited by a non-negligible n umber of consumers who do not search for other prices. In their model, the reason a consumer pays a high price is not that low prices are not available, but that he does not know where to nd them.
Also related is Elberfeld and Wolfstetter 1999. They consider a two-stage model in which rms rst decide whether to enter and then compete in prices. The outcome of the rst stage is known before the rms set their prices in the second stage. Thus, the outcome in the second stage is standard: a rm charges the monopoly price if it is the only rm in the market, otherwise prices are equal to marginal cost. Their main result is that the probability that no rm enters the market increases with the number of potential competitors. Their analysis is closely related to our two-stage game, the important di erence being that in our model the entry decision itself is not oberved before rms compete in prices.
Spulber 1995 analyzes a model of Bertrand competition when rms' cost functions are private information. He shows that the model has a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which rms set prices above marginal cost and have positive expected pro ts. In contrast, the rms in our model do not know h o w m a n y competitors they have, but assume that any competitor that does exist has the same cost structure. Even though the type of uncertainty v aries between Spulber's model and ours, the properties of the market equilibrium are similar: rms set prices above marginal cost and receive positive expected pro ts.
Another approach to positive pro ts under Bertrand competition can be found in the epsilon-equilibrium Bertrand model of Baye & Morgan 1999 . They show t h a t i f rms only choose prices to reach within epsilon of their maximal pro t, then a mixedstrategy equilibrium exists, in which pro ts are positive and large compared to the value of epsilon. Thus, if, due to satis cing or managerial slack, rms do not maximize pro ts completely, the Bertrand model generates more realistic outcomes. The model in our paper also introduces noise which generates a mixed strategy equilibrium, but our noise is the possibility that a customer does not have alternative sellers from whom to buy. Finally, our model is also of interest for students of auctions. The similarities between Bertrand price competition and rst-price sealed-bid auctions is well-known, as, e.g., Baye & Morgan 1997a, b explain. Our paper can be regarded as answering the question what is the optimal bid if the number of participantsin a sealed-bid auction is unknown, as is often the case in procurement bids, adding to the literature of which McAfee & Macmillan 1987 is an example.
Section 2 of the paper lays out the basic model and solves for the mixed strategy equilibrium. Section 3 shows how t h e e n try decision can be endogenized in three different t ypes of two-stage games. These three models also show some of the alternative ways our basic model may b e i n terpretated. Section 4 compares the outcome in the model with that of a Cournot model, and compares the expected industry pro ts in our model for di erent n umbers of potentially active rms with the empirical ndings of Bresnahan and Reiss 1991. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Let there be N rms that might produce a homogeneous good. Before deciding price, a rm does not know h o w many other rms are active in market. The probability a given rm is active i s , where 0 1. If = 1, the market is described by the Bertrand model of price competition, and the equilibrium price equals marginal cost. If = 0 so our one rm is assured of being a monopolist, it will charge the monopoly price. For simplicity, w e will assume that there is one consumer, who buys at most one unit, and his maximum willingness to pay for the good is v. In case of tied prices, the consumer picks a rm randomly. Marginal cost is normalized to 0.
First, let us establish that there is no symmetric Nash equilibrium with any rm putting positive probability o n c hoosing any particular price on the continuum. Suppose Firm 1 without loss of generality charges price p 0 with positive probability , rather than mixing over a continuous range of prices and putting in nitesimal probability o n e a c h. Putting positive probability o n p 0 = 0 is not pro t maximizing, because if the rm charged the monopoly price of v instead on those occasions it would have an expected payo of 1 , N,1 v, so let us focus on p 0 0. If p 0 0, and both rms are putting positive probability on p 0 , then with positive probability 2 they will both charge p 0 and they will each h a ve a contribution of 2 =2p 0 , 0 towards their expected pro ts. Firm 1 ccould increase its expected pro t, however, by deviating to putting zero weight o n p 0 and positive w eight o n p 0 , ; for su ciently small : This would replace the expected pro t of 2 =2p 0 , 0 with the larger expected pro t of 2 p 0 , . Thus, it cannot be that both rms put positive probability o n a n y p 0 in equilibrium.
Let us then consider a situation in which only Firm 1 chooses p 0 with positive probability mass. There then exists a neighborhood around p 0 where prices are not chosen with a strictly positive probability mass. We distinguish two possibilities. First, there exist a neighborhood p 0 ; x with x p 0 such that the probability t h a t Firm 2 charges a price in the neighborhood equals 0. This cannot be an equilibrium, as Firm 1 can increase p 0 without reducing its chance of winning the customer. Second, there exist a neighborhood p 0 ; x w i t h p 0 x such that the probability that Firm 2 charges a price in the whole neighborhood is strictly positive. This can also not be part of an equilibrium, however, as Firm 2 has an incentive to shift probability mass from prices just above p 0 to prices just below i t . Hence, there cannot be any equilibrium in which only one rm puts strictly positive probability o n any single price. In conjunction with the previous paragraph, this means that there is no equilibrium in which a n y rm chooses any price with positive probability m a s s . Second, the support over which a rm mixes in equilibrium is connected. Consider hat would happen if Firm 1 randomized over an unconnected support, which would include at least two i n tervals, denoted by 1 ; 1 a n d 2 ; 2 . It is easy to see that an optimal mixed strategy response of Firm 2 does not include prices in the interval 1 ; 2 . In this case, there exists, however, an 0 s u c h that Firm 1 will not be indi erent b e t ween setting a price of 1 , and setting a price of 2 + . T h us, a necessary condition for Firm 1 randomizing over 1 ; 1 and 2 ; 2 is violated. Let us therefore construct an equilibrium in mixed strategies with the strategies having a continuous and compact support. Let F i p be the probability that rm i charges a price smaller than p. The expected payo to rm i of charging a price p i when all other rms choose a mixed strategy according to F p i s
This expression can be explained in the following way. The probability t h a t exactly N , k , 1 out of the other N , 1 rms besides Firm i are active is equal to N , 1
The expected payo to rm i when exactly N , k , 1 rms are active and when it charges a price of p i is equal to p i times the probability that each o f t h e s e N , k , 1 rms charges a price that is larger than p i , which i s 1 , F p i N,k,1 p i . Multiplying these two terms and summing up over all k gives the expression above. Expression 1 is, of course, nothing but an application of the Binomial Theorem, and a standard result says that
Applying equation 3 to the pro t equation 1, we obtain
In equilibrium, rm i must be indi erent b e t ween all pure strategies that are in the support of the mixed strategy distribution. Hence, it must be that on some interval of prices the derivative of expression 4 with respect to p i equals zero. Thus, a necessary condition for any equilibrium in continuous mixed strategies is Result 7 implies that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with compact support, and we h a ve shown earlier that an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. These results are stated in Proposition 1. Proposition 1. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the Bertrand mod e l w i t h a n uncertain number of competitors is in mixed s t r ategies and the distribution function of a player's strategy is Price dispersion is a well-known outcome in real-world markets. Warner & Barsky 1995, for example, sampled prices at various stores in Michigan for a number ofidentical single products and found considerable dispersion. 1 Thus, the mixed strategy we found is quite consistent with reality. Figure 1 shows the cumulative density for di erent v alues of N using equation 8 with = :2 and v = 100 prices are at intervals of 1, connected. As N increases, each rm chooses relatively low prices with higher probability. As N becomes large, the cumulative density function approaches 1 for all values of p that are strictly positive. Of course, the equilibrium price under perfect competition is also equal to 0. The perfectly competitive outcome can be regarded as the limit case of the present m o d e l when the number of rms becomes very large. The intuition is straightforward. As the number of potential competitors increases, the probability of at least one other rm actively producing the same product rises. With greater probability of competition, the rm reduces its prices. In the limit, a rm is extremely likely to have at least one active competitor. Standard Bertrand competition comes into e ect and each rm charges a price equal to marginal cost.
Expected pro t for one rm can be found using the pure strategy pro t from charging p = v. Since the rm is active with probability , that pro t is i = 1 , N,1 v:
See Tables I and III of Warner and Barsky 1995. They found, for example, that a GI Joe had prices of 3.88, 2.93, 2.69, 2.96, 2.84, 2.96, and 2.69, while and a Hu y Vortex unassembled boy's bicycle had prices of 73.47, 99.99, 112.63, 119.99, 119.99, and 18.70. Note that individual pro t is declining in N and its sum, industry pro t, is equal 12
To s e e h o w industry pro t changes with N, note after some algebra that In the appendix it is shown that we can say more, namely
This means that pro ts are convexly decreasing in the numb e r o f r m s i n t h e industry, so the shape shown in the numerical examples graphed in Figure 2 in Section 4 w ould be found for any example.
More General Demand Structures
So far the assumption has been that the quantity demanded is one unit for all prices smaller than v and zero otherwise. Here, we will consider a more general demand function, which w e denote by Dp. For simplicity w e will restrict ourselves to the case N = 2 . We will impose one condition on this demand function, namely that pDp is increasing in p for p p m , where p m is the monopoly price. Most demand function that are commonly employed satisfy this condition. It is satis ed, for example, if pDp i s c o n c a ve i n p. In this section, we consider three front-end" games that endogenize whether a rm is active. We will limit the games to two potential rms each, since our aim is simply to illustrate how the probability in the previous model might arise. Section i is a standard model of entry that requires a xed cost. A rm does not know whether the other rm has entered when it must choose its price. Section ii is a model of output or capacity. T w o rms choose how m uch to produce before they set their prices. When setting prices they do not know the quantity c hosen by the other rm. Section iii is a model of product quality, where rms set prices not knowing which quality the other rm has chosen. In all these models, the activity c hoices of rms is random in the symmetric equilibria.
i A Model with a Fixed Entry Cost
Consider the following two-stage extension of the basic model. In the rst stage both rms decide whether or not they enter the industry. There is a xed entry cost denoted by F with F less than v, the consumer's reservation price. At the beginning of the second stage the rms have not observed whether the other rm has entered or not. In the second stage, the rms set a price if they entered in the rst stage. One example is a sealed bid auction with an entry fee, a common situation in government procurement: it is costly to prepare a bid, and when sending in their bids rms do not know h o w many competing bidders there are. As the outcome of the rst stage is not observed, we can analyze the game as a simultaneous move g a m e .
There are three equilibria. In the two asymmetric equilibria, one rm enters the market and sets a price equal to v, while the other rm stays out. In the third, symmetric, equilibrium, both rms are indi erent b e t ween entering the market or staying out and they enter the market with a certain probability . Given this probability o f e n tering, each rm chooses a price according to the mixed strategy distribution calculated in Section 2, with replacing . The expected payo in the second stage is 1 , v. The only way i n w h i c h the rms can be indi erent b e t ween staying out and entering the market is if 1, v equals the xed entry cost F . T h us, equals 1 , F= v , and expected pro ts are zero.
ii A Model of Output Choice Kreps & Scheinkman 1983 contains a model in which rms compete rst in outputs and then in prices. We can do something similar here. Consider a market with two consumers, each buying up to one unit each and with a reservation price of v. There are two rms, each of whom can decide in the rst stage whether to produce 1 or 2 units of a homogeneous output. In the second stage, rms compete in prices not knowing the decision of the other rm in the rst stage. The cost of producing 1 unit is normalized to 0 and the cost of producing 2 units is K v , possibly with K = 0 .
There does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies. It is not an equilibrium for Firm 1 to produce 1 unit and charge a high price, because Firm 2 would respond with 2 units and a slightly lower price, driving Firm 1's pro ts negative. There cannot be one in which Firm 1 chooses to produce 1 unit and charge a low price, because Firm 2 would respond with 1 unit and a price of v, making it pro table for Firm 1 to deviate and produce 2 units and charge slightly less than v. Nor can it be an equilibrium for Firm 1 to produce 2 units and charge a price greater than K, since Firm 2 would produce 2 units also and charge a lower price, making Firm 1 unpro table. Finally, it cannot be an equilibrium for Firm 1 to produce 2 units and charge a price of K or less, since Firm 2's best response would be to produce 1 unit and undercut Firm 1's price, in which case Firm 1 would do better to produce 1 unit and charge a price of v.
Let us then consider an equilibrium in mixed strategies: Each rm chooses with probability to produce 2 units, and otherwise produces 1 unit. If a rm happens to choose 1 unit, it will charge a price equal to v. The pro t of any rm producing 2 units is then where p 1 i is the price charged by r m i if it has produced 1 unit.
It is easy to see that given 24, the R.H.S. of 25 reduces to 1 , v, w h i c h i s independent o f p 1 i . Hence, given 24, it is optimal to set p 1 i = v.
The pro ts of producing 1 and 2 units are 1 , v and 21 , v , K. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, these two expressions have to be equal to each other, which implies that = v , K=K.
So, the entry decision here: with how many units to enter the Bertrand competition phase is random and the uncertainty about the existence of a erce Competitor has been derived endogeneously. 3 iii A Model of Choice o f P r oduct Quality So far we h a ve considered the situation that two or more rms do not know how m a n y competitors they have. An alternative i n terpretation is that the rms do not know whether consumers consider the products to be perfect substitutes. Let us suppose two rms can produce di erent qualities of the same product. In the rst stage, rms choose whether to produce low L or high H q u a l i t y. They know t h e quality they themselves produce, but they do not know the quality the competitor produces. In addition, the consumer also does not know w h i c h quality the rms produce. Low and high quality incur constant marginal production costs of c L and c H , with c H c L 0. In the second stage rms choose prices.
Let us consider the case in which a consumer buys one unit of a product: if he buys the high quality, he does not buy the low quality and vice versa. He derives utility o f v i , p from consuming quality i; i = L; H, w h e r e p is the price he pays for the product he buys. The consumer maximizes utility. In particular, if the consumer somehow can infer the quality of the products he will buy the high qualitygoodifand rms not knowing of each other whether they have l o w or high marginal cost cf., Spulber, 1995. We will rst consider the pricing game under the assumption that for any o f t h e two rms, consumers and the other rm believe that the rm produces low quality with probability , i.e., the rms randomly choose their product quality. Next, we will argue that this assumption can be justi ed. There are several types of equilibria in the present model. We will consider the case when c H , c L 2v H , v L and show that a continuum of separating equilibria exists, each o f w h i c h has a structure similar to the one considered in the previous models. 4 For convenience, we consider the following two restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. First, if a consumer observes an out-of-equilibrium price below c H , h e k n o ws that this price is set by a l o w-quality rm, because a high-quality rm that maximizes pro ts would never set such a price. Thus, we impose the belief that P = Ljp = 1 for all p c H . Note that this is implied by t h e I n tuitive Criterion of Cho & Kreps 1987 . Second, if a consumer observes an out-of-equilibrium price above c H , i t does not know whether it is set by a high or a low-quality rm. It seems reasonable, however, to impose that the consumer has the same beliefs no matter which price above c H is observed, i.e., P = Ljp = 0 for all p c H . 
Proof. First, we calculate the expected pro t of the low-quality rm in equilibrium.
When this rm sets a price p L c H + , v H , v L it is certain that the consumer will buy from it when the other rm produces high quality. Hence, its expected pro t is because the consumer will infer that it is a low quality product and will not buy it.
c The rm could deviate by setting p L in the interval c H ; c H + . Given the out-of-equilibrium beliefs we speci ed, the consumer thinks that there is a probability of 0 that the good is of a low q u a l i t y. Thus, the payo the consumer derives from buying at this price is 0 v L + 1 , 0 v H , p L . If the other rm is a high-quality rm, it would set a price of c H + and the consumer derives a payo of v H , c H , from buying at this price. As is smaller than 0 v H , v L , the last expression is always larger than the rst. Similarly, if the other rm happens to produce low quality, t h e maximum price it will charge is c H + , v H , v L and the consumer's payo from buying at such prices is larger than or equal to v L , c H +,v H ,v L , which reduces to v H , c H , . T h us, the consumer is always better o buying from the other rm and will not buy at a price in the interval c H ; c H + . Hence, it is not bene cial to deviate to such a price.
d The low quality rm could deviate by setting its price equal to c H + . T h e consumer will think that the price is set by a high quality rm and will to choose to buy from the low quality rm with probability 1 =2 if the other rm produces high quality and sets its equilibrium price. Accordingly, the payo of deviating in this way is equal to 1 , c H + , c L =2 . This is smaller than the equilibrium payo if 2v H , v L c H + , c L . Given the condition in the proposition, this is the case for all values of .
e The low quality rm could set a price p L c H + . This is a situation similar to c, the only di erence being that the rm considers charging even higher prices. Following the argument under c, it is clear that the consumer will not buy at such a high price. Accordingly, the low q u a l i t y rm is not better o deviating from its equilibrium strategy.
Let us now consider the high-quality rm. In equilibrium, the expected payo of this type of rm is given by =2 . W e consider two possible deviations. a A deviation to a price p H c H yields a non-positive p a yo and is therefore not undertaken.
b For a deviation to a price p H such that either c H N p H c H + or p H c H + , w e can give an identical argument a s a b o ve under c and or e: the consumer will not buy at this price and, hence, this deviation leads to a lower payo .
We can conclude that it is not pro table for any t ype of rm to deviate from their equilibrium strategies. Q.E.D.
The mixed strategy distribution of the low quality rm has the same structure as the mixed strategies we h a ve encountered before. This becomes apparent i f w e recall that earlier we h a ve assumed that the cost of production is zero set c L = 0 and that the maximum price a rm can set is not anymore given by v, but by t h e price the rm can set to distinguish itself from a high quality rm, i.e., replace v by c H + , v H , v L . If we substitute these values into the expression of the mixed strategy equilibrium, we h a ve the same expression as in Section 2.
We w i l l n o w analyze the rms' quality decision. First, note that there exists an equilibrium in which both rms choose low q u a l i t y and set prices equal to c L . More importantly for our paper, however, there exists a continuum of equilibria, parametrized by , e a c h o f w h i c h P areto-dominates the equilibrium just described. In each of these equilibria, rms choose to produce low q u a l i t y with probability , where is such that the expected pro t of the low quality and the high quality choices are equal to each other. More precisely, for each 0, is such that
Comparing Bertrand and Cournot
Cournot 1838 proposed a model in which N rms simultaneously c hoose quantities and let the market determine the price. Bertrand 1883 pointed out that entirely di erent conclusions result if the rms choose prices simultaneously instead. Even though the assumptions of price competition seem more realistic, the quantity model yields more realistic outcomes, because pro ts are positive, but fall gradually as the number of rms increases. We h a ve s h o wn that this objectionable feature of the Bertrand model disappears when uncertainty about the presence of competitors is taken into account. We will now see what happens to the Cournot model when uncertainty is added, and compare the Bertrand and Cournot models under uncertainty. To m a k e the comparison clearer, we will use linear demand, 
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The monopoly price then equals a=2 and the quantity demanded is a=2b at that price.
We will compute the expected pro ts from Cournot and Bertrand for di erent levels of N to obtain some idea of the e ects of concentration in each. 
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Adding uncertainty eliminates the discontinuous behavior of the original Bertrand model. Uncertainty m a k es a big di erence, and the comparative statics become consistent and intuitive. Pro ts are always positive, but they fall whenever the number of rms or the probability of more rms being active increases. In every case, expected industry pro ts are conditional upon at least one rm being active. When = 0, this is to be interpreted as the probability zero but nonetheless possible event t h a t one rm is active and the expected number of other rms is zero.
Cournot Equilibrium
Now let us compute the Cournot equilibrium. Let q be the Cournot output we are trying to determine. 
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Equation 35 is conditional upon N q being not so large as to drive the price to zero, which might rationally happen, since a rm would be willing to accept a price of zero occasionally as the result of all N rms coincidentally being active a n d producing a large amount. Figure 3 depicts Cournot pro ts for di erent degrees of activity and concentration, using the same numerical parameters as the Bertrand pro ts in Figure 2 . which is decreasing in both N and . Table 1 and Figure 4 show the outcomes of our numerical example for di erent degrees of concentration under Cournot and Bertrand behavior with certainty a n d with = :8. Figure 4 also illustrates the Bresnahan-Reiss empirical result, of which more will be said later. As we h a ve seen, uncertainty c hanges the Bertrand model in a crucial way, because pro ts do become positive and monotonic in the number of rms. The sharp fall in pro ts moving from monopoly to duopoly under certainty i n the Bertrand model is perhaps not so unreasonable as it looks. It is extreme, but it is a limiting result as goes to one, as Figures 2 and 4 illustrate. Consider the shape of the pro t-concentration paths. All the curves in Figures 2 through 4 have c o n vex shapes, if only weakly in the limiting cases, but the curvatures, and therefore the empirical implications, are di erent. As Figure 4 and Table 1 , in particular, show, pro ts decline much more rapidly in Bertrand than in Cournot. For the parameters chosen, industry pro ts fall from the monopoly level of 2500 to duopoly pro ts of 833, triopoly pro ts of 242, and low l e v els thereafter. Cournot pro ts show a m uch more uniform decline as concentration falls.
Comparison of Figures 2 and 3 shows that for smaller values of the activity probability the Bertrand pro t path becomes atter and the Cournot path, perhaps more curved, but even at extreme values Cournot does not generate such sharp di erences from the addition of one rm to the market.
For most modelling purposes, these models are building blocks, and such subtle di erences in the pro t-concentration path are unimportant. They are interesting, however, if one wishes to consider Bertrand and Cournot as serious oligopoly models in their own right. Empirically, then, how do pro ts react to the number of rms? Do they decline to zero with duopoly and then stay constant, as in the original Bertrand model? Do they decline smoothly, a s e i t h e r v ersion of the Cournot model would suggest? Or do they decline rapidly, as the Bertrand model with uncertainty w ould suggest?
Measuring the relationship between pro ts and concentration is an old exercise now in some disrepute. 8 The di culty is that the usual unit of observation has been the industry. This is natural enough, since one needs a measurement of concentration for each observation. Comparing accounting pro ts across industries is fraught with danger, however, since accounting pro ts di er from economic pro ts in ways that depend on the industry chosen and which are very likely to be correlated with technology, and hence with concentration. Moreover, it is not clear that the concentration-pro ts path is even the same across industries.
Bresnahan & Reiss 1991 took a clever empirical approach to the same problem. They took the unit of observation to be the market for a particular product in a particular small town, rather than for many products over the entire United States, and they looked at market size rather than directly at pro ts. They collected data on the size of a town and the numberofdentists there, for example. If a town is very small|say, 500 people|-it will have n o d e n tist, since a dentist incurs a xed cost and could not make a n y pro t there even as a monopoly. If it grows to 800 people, it will have one dentist, since the pro ts are enough for monopoly, b u t e n try by a second dentist would drive them negative. If the town grows to 1,600 people, however, it may s t i l l h a ve only one dentist| if entry by the second dentist would not just split the industry pro ts, but reduce them. Bresnahan and Reiss used this approach to estimate the thresholds s i for entry in small marke t s f o r a n umber of industries. Table 2 shows these thresholds in thousands of inhabitants per rm. Table 3 rescales the same numbers to be very roughly comparable with the numerical example used earlier in this paper. 10 The rescaling is somewhat arbitrary, since the theory of Bresnahan and Reiss is that some quasi-rents remain to cover xed cost even when the minimum scale for entry attens out, but it creates a comparison measure for how t h e i n tensity of competition changes with the number of rms.
Number What is signi cant i s h o w pro ts atten out, even though the choice of 0 as the at level in Table 3 is arbitrary. The empirical result that going from one rm 9 Calculated from Table 5A of Bresnahan & Reiss 1991 . Note that the entry of .79 in the second row of their original paper is a mistake and should be 1.09, and their Figure 4 illustrates s i =s 5 , not the s 5 =s i in the legend. Table 3 's rescaling uses the following procedure. De ne the monopoly level of pro ts in an industry to be 2500, and the competitive l e v el to be 0. Assume that when s i reaches its maximum level s m over 1; 5 , the competitive l e v el of pro ts is reached and any further changes are measurement error. Apply the conversion formula Table 3 results. to two i s m uch more important than going from two to three, and that full-edged competition kicks in very quickly matches the Bertrand model with uncertainty v ery well, and is inconsistent with the Cournot model.
We do not want to argue that the Bertrand model with uncertainity is the only model that may explain the data presented. Other models in the industrial organizations literature may also explain the data. To illustrate that it is not that easy, however, to explain these data, let us consider the Salop 1979 model as set out in Tirole 1988, pp.282-4 with linear and or quadratic cost for an exogenously determined value of N. With linear quadratic cost, the relation between price and N is given by p = c + t=N, respecively p = c + t=N 2 , where t is a transportation cost parameter and c is marginal cost. As toptal demand is constant i n t h e S a l o p m o d e l , industry pro ts are given by t=N, a n d t=N 2 , respectively Confronting these equations with the Bresnahan and Reiss results reveals that pro ts in the Salop model do not decline exponentially as our model and the empirical results suggests.
Concluding Remarks
The Bertrand model with uncertainty a b o u t t h e n umber of competitors is simple, but its properties are both interesting and useful, and, in particular, the extreme transition from monopoly to competition found in the standard Bertrand model disappears. Expected pro ts are positive, but decline with the number of rms in the industry, and decline in a way that empirical work suggest is more realistic than the way they decline in the Cournot model. We h a ve tried to show that the model is useful both as a simple description of oligopoly and as a building block for other topics in industrial organization, and this usefulness has already been illustrated in Gwin 1997, and Janssen and Van Reeven 1998. Appendix on Convexity This appendix shows that Bertrand industry pro ts are convex in N. The second derivative d 2 b dN 2 is derived from the rst derivative in 13, which c a n be rewritten as 
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The rst term of this expression is negative because log1 , is negative.
The second term has the same sign as 2 , 21 , N + N l o g 1 , 1 + 1 , N :
39
We will show that expression 39 is also negative for all N and all 2 0; 1.
We will rst show that it is negative for N = 1 . In this case we can de ne f = 2 +2, log1, . It is easy to see that f0 = f 0 0 = 0 and that f 00 = , 1, 2 , which is strictly negative for all 0. Hence, for all 2 0; 1, f 0.
Let us then consider for xed , 
